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Familial Disclosure in Defiance of Nonconsent
To the Editor:
The ASHG statement on “Professional Disclosure of Fa-
milial Genetic Information” (American Society of Hu-
man Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial
Disclosure 1998) asserts that patient confidentiality may
be breached without the consent of the patient when
giving genetic-risk information to family members may
result in avoidance or treatment of a serious risk of harm
having, at least in part, a genetic cause. The statement
also asserts that the conditions for breaching of confi-
dentiality should be discussed with the patient “both
prior to genetic testing and again if the patient refuses
to communicate results” (American Society of Human
Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial Disclo-
sure 1998, p. 475). Although this is consistent with the
recommendations of the President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research (1983) and of the Institute of
Medicine Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks (1994),
which came before it, we think that the prerogative to
violate patient confidences that is proposed by this state-
ment is unnecessary and misguided. In the spirit of de-
bate anticipated by the ASHG Social Issues Subcom-
mittee on Familial Disclosure, we offer the following
critique.
The statement’s recommendations rely on the excep-
tion to make the rule. It is probably accurate to presume
that most patients will share important information with
family members. In some small number of cases, patients
will not want to share information about themselves
with their family, and that is their right to decide. Con-
trol of information about oneself is a fundamental em-
bodiment of privacy, and confidentiality—whether it
arises out of the quasi-fiduciary nature of the provider-
patient relationship or out of the implied or expressed
contract of employment of a health-care provider by a
patient—is the backbone of the provider-patient trust
relationship. Furthermore, the physician or counselor
cannot presume to have complete and accurate infor-
mation about the patient’s family history and interper-
sonal dynamics, about false paternity and adoptions,
about the patient’s relationships with his or her relatives,
and about how information may be received by those
others. Although problems of this nature may affect few
families, they may be prevalent in cases giving rise to
confidentiality disagreements. In these cases, providing
genetic information to third parties could do more harm
than good.
The statement fails to stress the necessary condition
of consent to familial involvement, before any testing is
performed. If the patient states, before testing, that she
does not want to involve her family, regardless of results,
then the provider must decide whether she is willing to
perform the test under those conditions. If the provider
truly believes that testing is in the best interest of her
patient, she should perform the test and not be con-
fronted with the ethical or legal “privilege” to violate
her patient’s trust. If she feels that these obligations to
others outweigh her time-tested duties to respect and act
in the best interest of her patient, she should decline to
perform the test and should refer to another provider
who may be willing to do so. It is essential that these
considerations be fully engaged and resolved before any
test is conducted.
The alternative solution offered by the statement will
promote dishonesty and a lack of candor. The provider
is at once instructed to build a trusting relationship with
her patient (not with patient’s family, it is important to
note), to elicit information about first- and second-de-
gree relatives, to counsel about the uncertain and sen-
sitive nature of information that can be developed in
genetic testing, and to discuss the possible familial-dis-
closure limitations on what the patient reasonably may
expect to be an otherwise confidential relationship. Ac-
cording to the statement, the provider then is permitted
to violate that trust, not merely “without consent” but
in open defiance of nonconsent. To our minds, the risk
posed by the exceptional, secretive patient is not so great
as to justify the statement’s policy.
Moreover, the statement’s solution will not work. The
secretive patient simply may not tell the inquisitive pro-
vider about his family, or he may lie. If the patient does
not disclose all relatives’ names, how will the provider
know? Is the provider obligated to do any independent
research? And, after testing, how will the provider know
that all at-risk relatives have been informed by the
patient?
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The statement relies, inappropriately, on two recent
U.S. state court opinions, Pate v. Threkel and Safer v.
Estate of Pack. In the Pate case, the high court of Florida
held that the physician’s duty to warn family members
at risk is fulfilled by telling the patient that relatives
should be informed. In the Safer case, an intermediate
appellate court in New Jersey held that the physician
owes a duty of reasonable care to inform family mem-
bers, which may include direct communication with
identifiable family members even if that entails a breach
of confidentiality. The Safer case is tied up in the courts
on appeals regarding procedural issues. The New Jersey
Supreme Court may not hear the case to resolve its sub-
stantive questions for several years, if ever. If anything,
the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in the Pate case
should be accorded greater deference. It is, at best, much
too soon and, at worst, erroneous to conclude, as does
the ASHG subcommittee, that these cases “may indicate
an increasing trend toward disclosure” (American So-
ciety of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on
Familial Disclosure 1998, p. 480).
Health-care providers should not allow the fear of
litigation and isolated judicial rulings such as that in the
Safer case to dominate their ethical decision making. The
courts as a general rule will not hold providers liable
for harm arising from ethical practices, and the ASHG
statement is an opportunity for the genetics community
to embrace and advocate patient confidentiality, not to
undermine it further. Unfortunately, the statement
hedges about the bounds of the provider’s obliga-
tions—and about their nature. The statement declares
that it is permissible to disclose genetic information un-
der certain circumstances, but it stops short of declaring
an ethical duty to warn identifiable and contactable fam-
ily members directly. Failure to articulate clearly the eth-
ical bounds of physician discretion may invite the courts
to do so, and, if the courts read the recommended priv-
ilege as arising from such a duty, then there may well
be less discretion for the individual practitioner than is
implied in the nuanced approach of the statement.
It is better public policy to respect patient trust, con-
fidences, and decisions on family matters by limiting the
provider’s obligation to the following: (1) providing in-
formation about familial risk, testing, mitigation, and
treatment; (2) urging patients to inform and involve at-
risk relatives; and (3) securing express written consent
to specific familial disclosures. Providers should have
discussions that focus on the reasons for familial in-
volvement, addressing issues such as the following: Has
the patient considered the effects of sharing the test re-
sults, whether positive or negative—or even of revealing
the mere fact that testing is called for—with her adult
and minor relatives, including those with whom the pa-
tient has no active relationship? In contrast, what are
the possible consequences of testing and withholding
results? Does the patient imagine that she could withhold
information from all relatives—or only from those who
are estranged? Does the patient intend—or think it pos-
sible—to go to her grave while keeping the test results
a secret?
Again, this dialogue and consent must occur and be
settled before testing occurs. If no consent is secured,
then the provider may refuse to conduct the testing, but,
if she chooses to test, then there may be no disclosure
of those results to third parties. This policy will achieve
the aims of providing probabilistic risk information to
family members nearly all the time; it avoids placing on
the provider poorly defined and potentially unbounded
duties that conflict with her quasi-fiduciary and con-
tractual obligations to her patients; it avoids undermin-
ing the trust that patients place in their providers; and
it is consistent and workable.
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